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We analyse the following question associated with flexible outsourcing under an imperfect 
domestic labour market: How does the implementation of profit sharing for low-skilled 
workers influences flexible outsourcing? We show that in general the implementation of a 
profit sharing scheme leads to a substitution effect which results in a low-skilled wage. 
Since outsourcing and the domestic wage level are negative correlated, profit sharing has 
an outsourcing decreasing character. However, the labour union determination of effort 
leads to a constant effort level, in which case a firm’s optimal choice of profit sharing is 
zero. 
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1.      Introduction 
 
Marginal cost differences are a main argument on a firm’s decision for or 
against outsourcing. It is without controversy that the high wage and labour costs, 
especially in Western European countries, are the driving forces for their marginal 
cost disadvantage. Therefore the wage differences are the central explanation for the 
growing business practice of offshoring and international outsourcing to Eastern 
European or Asian countries. One reason for the observed wage gap is the difference 
in the process of wage determination. While in most Western European countries 
wages are determined by bilateral bargaining between firms or employer federations 
and trade unions, in Eastern European or Asian countries wages are determined by 
market forces, because unions here are much weaker (see e.g. Du Caju et al., 2008). 
In this paper we assume that outsourcing is flexible, which means that it is 
determined after the domestic wage formation. Therefore we are in line with Skaksen 
(2004), who analyses potential (non-realized) and realized international outsourcing.  
He distinguishes three cases: First, if the outsourcing costs are very low, the union will 
desist from wage dumping to avoid outsourcing. Second, the firm will desist from 
outsourcing if costs are very high. In this case, the union can set a relatively high wage 
without the fear of substitution of domestic employment by external procurement. 
Third, for an intermediate cost level, the union can avoid outsourcing if the wage is 
equal to the outsourcing costs. Thus, the wage level depends positively on the 
outsourcing costs. In contrast, Braun and Scheffel (2007) find that the costs of 
outsourcing have an ambiguous effect on wage sets by the labour union.  
Due to the threat of flexible outsourcing, the opportunity of the labour union to 
realize a high wage level will be dampen. However, the labour union wants to realize 
a high income for its members and therefore lower wages are not possible. To solve 
this puzzle another instrument has to be implemented that realize a high work income 
and lower the incentive for outsourcing by decreasing the wage.  
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Such an instrument can be profit sharing, which can substitute wage income by 
profit income, without losing total remunerations. Thus, there can be an incentive for a 
lower base wage and domestic labour becomes advantageously, without losses for the 
union or worker.  
From the firms point of view the domestic marginal costs are determined by 
the base wage. Since the domestic wage decreases, profit sharing will decrease 
outsourcing. However, due to the profit participation another advantages for the firm 
has to be realized. This advantage can be a productivity effect, since the profit 
participation setting incentives to increase worker’s effort, while improving the 
working atmosphere.1 However, if profit sharing is used to increase the individual 
effort there is a moral hazard or free-riding problem. This problem can be solved, if 
effort is interpreted as working conditions such as the speed of the production line, 
and therefore it can be part of wage negotiations.  
For that case the literature mainly focuses on comparing the effort level set by 
a union and the effort level in a competitive market or analysis the effect of bargaining 
power on effort level and efficiency properties.2 Also, the implementation of profit 
sharing schemes is analysed with collective bargaining. Pohjola (1987) and Anderson 
and Devereux (1989) show that an efficient but unenforceable bargaining outcome, 
since direct negotiation on the total employment is precluded, can be made 
enforceable by introducing bargaining over wages and profit share. Additionally, 
Anderson and Devereux (1989) show that for efficient bargaining over wages and 
employment, implementing profit sharing has no effect on wages, employment and 
profit, if profit sharing is exogenously increased by the legislator or if it is a part of the 
optimal contract. 
In this paper we use the approach where the union sets the wage and the effort, 
while the firm sets the profit share, and analyse: How does profit sharing influence 
flexible outsourcing? Based on this, due to comparative statics, we further show how 
                                                             
1  Introducing a profit sharing scheme can increase the motivation of a worker and thus effort, see 
Cable and FitzRoy (1980). On the other hand Jones and Pliskin (1991) and Kruse (1993) find 
negative productivity effects of profit sharing.  
2  Bulkley (1992) shows that a monopoly union will reduce the specified effort level below that 
which would be demanded by the firm in its absence. Moreover, Bulkley and Myles (1996) 
showed that the popular wisdom that unions reduce effort is generally false. The effect of 
bargaining power if effort is negotiable has also been analysed by Sampson (1993) and Bulkley 
and Myles (1997). They show that in a generalized Nash bargaining between a labour  union and 
a  firm  over  employment  and  effort,  the  higher  bargaining  power  of  the  firm  can  increase  the  
effort level. 
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outsourcing costs influence the wage level. The analysis shows that the union sets an 
effort level, which is unaffected by the wage and profit sharing. However, profit 
sharing can decrease the wage and thus outsourcing. For the optimal profit share we 
find that the firm will not implement any profit sharing scheme. For our minor 
question we find that in the presence of outsourcing, due to a more elastic labour 
demand, the base wage is lower than in the absence of outsourcing.  
We  proceed  as  follows.  The  basic  structure  of  the  theoretical  framework  is  
briefly presented in section 2. In section 2.1, we derivate the optimal labour and 
outsourcing demand. Section 2.2 investigates the effort and wage formation by the 
monopoly trade union. Finally, we sum up our conclusions in section 3.  
  
2.      Basic Framework 
 
We assume that output depends not only on domestic labour and international 
outsourcing, but also on the average effort by workers, i.e. the worker’s productivity. 
This lies in conformity with the efficiency wage hypothesis form (see Akerlof and 
Yellen 1986). The timing captures the idea that the representative firm is flexible in 
deciding about the amount of outsourcing simultaneously with domestic labour 
demand, but commits to profit sharing before wage and effort determination. After the 
firm has made its decision on profit sharing, the monopoly trade union sets the wage 
and effort with respect to the profit share level. Knowing the base wage, the 
representative firm determines outsourcing and employment. The timing of events is 
depicted as in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: sequence of events 
 
Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3              
 
profit sharing ?   wage and effort  outsourcing and labour  
                      formation w , e         demand ML ,  
 
The decisions at each stage are analysed by using backward induction. 
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1.1    Optimal Outsourcing and Labour Demand  
In this section, we characterize the optimal labour demand and outsourcing by 
the representative firm by taking profit sharing, wage and effort as given. The revenue 
function is presented as 
 
    ? ? ? ? 1
11
,
???
???
?
???
? ??
?
??
?
?
?
?
MLeMLY ,                                 (1) 
 
where the price of the output is normalized to unity, L  is  the  amount  of  domestic  
labour, e  characterizes the average effort level and M  is the firm’s labour input 
acquired from external suppliers through outsourcing.3 The parameter 10 ?? ?  
indicates decreasing returns to scale and ?  denotes the elasticity of substitution 
between effective labour and outsourcing. Following the empirical evidence of Munch 
and Skaksen (2009), we assume that there is a substitutability between effective labour 
and outsourcing, by focusing on ??? ?1 .  
The firm decides on domestic labour and outsourcing to maximize the profit 
function 
 
   ? ? ? ? ?? ?cMLwYMax
ML
?????? ??? 11
),(
,                                   (2) 
 
by taking the negotiated effort e , wage w ,   and  the  profit  share  ? , as given. 
Furthermore, we assume that the the costs of outsourcing c  includes other costs as 
transport and communication costs or costs for monitoring and quality control. To be 
simple, we sum these kinds of costs and assume that the unit costs of outsourcing are 
constant. 
The first-order conditions of equation (2) can be expressed as  
 
    ???
?
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?
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1111 ????
???? LYew , 
    ???
?
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111 ???
??? MYc . 
 
The solution of the first order conditions by using equation (1) yields the conditional 
labour and outsourcing demand: 
                                                             
3  We follow the efficiency wage literature and assume that effort is labour augmenting. 
Consequently, Le  can be interpreted as effective labour. 
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    ? ?? ? ??????? 11111/ YewcewL ????? ????? ,                   (3a) 
    ? ?? ? ?????? 1111/ YccewM ???? ???? .                           (3b) 
  
Resulting from our assumption of substitutability, we have 0?LMY  respectively 
0?MLY . From the production function (1), one get that this is only true for 
?? ?? 1
1 , which will be assumed in the following analysis. As one can see from the 
conditional demand functions, domestic labour demand is a negative function of wage 
and a positive function of outsourcing costs and effort. Thus, higher outsourcing cost 
will decrease domestic labour demand, which lies in conformity with empirics as 
shown by e.g. Görg and Hanley (2005). However, labour demand does not directly 
depend on profit sharing, which in line with empirical studies as Wadwani and Wall 
(1990) and Cahuc and Dormont (1997). For outsourcing, we find that external 
procurement  is  a  positive  function  of  domestic wage rate and a negative function of 
outsourcing costs and effort (see Appendix 1).  
The wage elasticity of labour demand, can be expressed as  
 
    ? ? ??? ?????? 11
ss
L
wLw ,                                       (4) 
 
where ? ?? ? ??
?
??
?
?
?
11
1
/
/
cew
ews  characterizes the cost share of labour. In the absence of 
outsourcing, the wage elasticity is constant and smaller, i.e. ??? ???? 1
1
0M
. 
 
 
1.2    Wage and Effort Formation by Monopoly Labour Union  
As we mentioned in the introduction, effort could be interpreted as a working 
condition, which can be determined in bargaining rounds between labour unions and 
firms. In this analysis we assume a simultaneous setting of wage and effort by the 
employee federation. 
 
 
 Wage and Effort Determination  
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The individual utility function for the employed worker is (5a) and for the 
unemployed worker (5b) 
 
    ? ?eg
L
wv ??? *?? ,                                                  (5a) 
    bv ? ,                                                                         (5b) 
 
so that utility is assumed to be linear in income, where *?  characterizes the indirect 
profit function. In addition we assume that provision of effort is associated with a 
disutility for the worker, which is assumed to satisfy the convex function 
? ? ?? /1eeg ?  with 10 ?? ? , i.e. ? ? ? ? 0'',' ?egeg . 
Following the standard literature, it is assumed that a monopoly labour union is 
interested in the income of union members, so that the objective function is 
? ? vLNvLV ??? . Therefore, we can rewrite the union utility as 
 
  ? ? ? ? NbLegLbwVMax
ew
?????? *
),(
????? s.t. 0?? ML ?? ,             (6) 
 
where b  captures the exogenous minimum income for labour union members N .  
Maximizing in terms of the base wage and effort subject to labour and 
outsourcing demand gives  
 
    ? ? ? ? 0* ?????? wwww LegbwLLV ?? ,                   (7) 
 
which by using Lw ??*?  can be solved as ? ? ? ?gbw ????? ?? )1( , so that we have  
 
    
? ?gbw ???
?
??
?
??? 1??
? .                                              (8) 
 
This is an implicit form concerning wage formation, because the numerator and 
denominator of the mark-up depend in a non-linear way on the wage rate according to 
equation (4).  
The first-order condition for the optimal effort level is  
 
    ? ? ? ? ? ? 0'* ?????? eLgLegbwLV eeee ?? .             (9) 
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By using L
e
w
e ??*?  and 1??? ??eeL
eL
, the first-order condition (9) can be 
expressed as follows 
 
    ? ?
11
1 /1
??????
?
??
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??
?? ????
? ?egbw .                             (10) 
 
A simultaneous solution of (8) and (10) gives the optimal effort 
 
 
    
?
? ??
?
??
?
?
?
1
be .                                                             (11) 
 
Our analysis shows that the optimal effort level, decided by the monopoly labour 
union,  is  independent  of  profit  share  or  base  wage.  Thus,  we  see  that  profit  sharing  
does not affect effort provision and, therefore, does not increase productivity. This 
result is plausible in our framework for two reasons. The first is that higher effort 
provision leads to higher disutility for the worker and therefore lowers the union 
utility, which can be avoided by a constant effort. Of course, one may argue that this 
will  negatively  affect  the  worker’s  income,  since  higher  effort  leads  to  higher  profit  
and thus increases worker’s income. But the labour union has a second instrument to 
influence a firm’s profit and thus the worker’s income. Therefore, the second reason is 
that the labour union can affect worker’s income by its wage setting, which indicates 
the wage effect of profit sharing.  
Knowing that effort is unaffected by profit sharing, we can show in which way 
the wage is influenced, which helps us to answer our research question. In the 
introduction,  we  mentioned  that  implementing  profit  sharing  can  have  a  wage  
moderation  effect.  To  verify  this,  we  can  take  a  look  at  the  equations  above.  The  
equations  (8)  and  (11)  show that  profit  sharing  has  only  a  direct  effect  on  the  wage  
level, which can be seen in the denominator. We call this effect the substitution effect, 
since it decreases the base wage, meaning that a former part of the base wage is 
substituted by profit income. Analytically, this can be shown by using the total 
differential of (8) 
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   ? ?
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with ?
?
??
?
? ???
???
? ??
?
1
1
w
s
w
and ? ?ss
ww
s ????
? 11 ? . Due to our assumptions 1??  and 
?? ?? 1
1  we get 0??
?
w
s  and therefore 0??
?
w
? .  The  wage  effect  of  profit  sharing  
can be explained by the union’s marginal costs of an increasing wage. However, we 
only  focus  on  the  part  of  the  marginal  costs  that  are  affected  by  profit  sharing.  This  
means we are only interested in the impact of wages on the total profit (see (7)). Since 
a higher wage will decrease profit income, a higher profit share increases this utility 
loss. Due to this increasing effect on the union’s marginal costs, higher profit sharing 
will induce a less aggressive wage setting (see Weitzman 1987, Jackman 1988, 
Wadhwani 1988, Fung 1989, Holmlund 1990).   
Although we find that profit sharing has a complementary character for the 
base wage, in the empirical literature there is also evidence for a supplementary 
property of profit sharing.4 In the absence of outsourcing we have 0
0
?
?
?
?Mw
? ,  so that 
base wage does not affect the wage elasticity of labour demand. In that case, we get 
qualitatively the same result 0
1
1
1
0
0
?
???
?? ?
? ??
?
M
M
w
d
dw .  
In a similar way we can also look at the wage reaction concerning changes in 
outsourcing costs. The reaction of the wage elasticity is described by 
0
1
1 ??
?
??
?
? ???
???
? ??
?
c
s
c
 since we found that ? ? 011 ?????
? ss
cc
s ? . Higher 
outsourcing costs reduce ceteris paribus the demand for outsourcing. On the other 
side, due to the substitutability of inputs, domestic labour demand increases and 
makes the labour demand more inelastic (as shown by e.g. Hasan et al. 2007, 
                                                             
4  By using US data, Black and Lynch (2004) show that profit sharing results in lower regular pay 
for workers, which implies a compensatory character, but in Wadhwani and Wall (1990) by 
using UK data and also in Kraft and Ugarkovic (2005) by using German panel data, it is shown 
that introducing profit sharing does not reduce the wage, which implies a supplementary 
character. 
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Slaughter 2001 and Senses 2010), which open the opportunity for the union to set a 
higher wage. Algebraically the wage effect of changing outsourcing costs is given by 
 
    
? ?
? ?
0
)1(1
1
?
?
?????
?
??
??
?
???
?
??
w
w
w
c
dc
dw ,                        (13) 
 
so that in the presence of flexible outsourcing, higher outsourcing costs will increase 
the wage. This holds, as lower outsourcing costs means higher outsourcing demand, 
so that the labour demand elasticity becomes more elastic and the wage has to fall 
accordingly to avoid higher outsourcing with lower in-house costs and make 
integrated production more attractive. We summarize our findings in 
 
Proposition 1:  
In the presence of flexible outsourcing, 
a) union bargaining over effort is unaffected by base wage and profit sharing, 
and 
b) profit sharing is a complementary part of income, and 
c) lower outsourcing costs will lower the wage.   
 
We now analyse the effect of implementing profit sharing in a firm that engages in 
outsourcing.  The  working  channel  of  committed  profit  sharing  on  the  amount  of  
outsourcing can be derived from the conditional outsourcing demand (3b). Here we 
find that 
 
    
? ?
0???
??
?? d
dw
dw
dM
d
dM ,                                                  (14) 
 
so that the effect of implementing profit sharing is negative.  
 
Proposition 2:  
Since profit sharing decreases domestic marginal costs, outsourcing activities 
becomes less attractive and decrease. 
 
As we know from (3b), the outsourcing demand depends on the outsourcing costs, 
effort  and wage. However,  the outsourcing costs and the effort  level are constant,  so 
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that only wage changes affect the amount of outsourcing. Since profit sharing leads 
due to a less aggressive wage setting to a lower wage, this reduction alone induces 
lower outsourcing. The reason for this is intuitive. Due to a lower wage level, the 
domestic marginal costs decrease, thereby increasing the advantage of integrated 
production and inducing a higher labour demand. 
Although it is known that lower domestic marginal costs work in favour of 
domestic production and that profit sharing has a decreasing wage effect, to our 
knowledge, ours is the first analysis which incorporates outsourcing, wage bargaining 
and direct worker participation in a firm’s success via profit sharing.5 
 
 
 Committed Profit Sharing  
In  the  previous  analysis,  we  have  shown  the  effects  of  profit  sharing  on  the  
base wage and outsourcing demand. Since, in our framework, profit sharing is a 
commitment  by  the  firm,  we  have  to  analyse  the  grounds  on  which  a  firm  will  
introduce it or not. To close the model, we therefore concentrate in this section on the 
optimal profit share.  
The representative firm commits to profit sharing to maximize its profit subject 
to labour demand (3a), outsourcing (3b), wage formation (8) and effort determination 
(11), so that  
 
    
? ?
? ? ? ? ?? ?cMLwYMax ???????? ????
?
11 *               (15)          
                             
   s.t. 0** ?? ML ??                                         
  
?
? ???
?
???
?
?
?
1
be         
  
? ?? ?egbw ???? ??
?
1
. 
 
                                                             
5  Empirically, Budd et al. (2005), show that affiliate wages also depend positively on the profit of 
the parent firm. This can be understood as profit sharing within a multinational firm and explains 
partly why a multinational affiliate pays higher wages than a purely domestic firm. In other 
studies as Antras (2003 and 2005) or Grossman et al. (2005) profit sharing is incorporated, too. 
However, their focus is on bargaining between the outsourcing partners to distribute the rent, 
which is created from the contractual relationship.  
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The first-order condition is ? ? 01 ** ???? ???? . Using this, we can solve the optimal 
committed profit sharing set by the firm by the rewritten first order condition to 
 
    
*
*
1
??
?? ?? .                                                                (16) 
 
Since 0* ??  and 0* ???  is true, we can conclude that the left hand side of (16) has to 
be positive and therefore the share, which is deviated to the workforce fulfils 1?? . It 
is intuitive that the workforce gets either only the wage or the wage plus a share of the 
profit. Thus, we have to check that 10 ?? ?  is fulfilled, which means that the firm 
will implement a profit sharing scheme. 
According to (16) for 10 ?? ?  we  have  to  show  that  1/ ** ???? . Using the 
former results, we get for the first derivative with respect to profit sharing 
0* ???? L
d
dw
?? ? . Thus the relationship to analyse is ?? ddwL //
* ?? , where L/*?  
can be expressed by 
s
w
L ?
?? ?? 1
*
. 
At  first  we  will  solve  (16)  for  the  optimal  profit  share  in  the  absence  of  
outsourcing. Using the knowledge that 1?s  and ? ? ??? ????? 11/1
w
d
dw  we can 
rewrite (16) to ? ? ?
?
??
? ??
???
? 1
11/1
1 . Solving this expression leads to 0
0
??M? . 
Thus, the firm will desist from a profit sharing scheme in the absence of outsourcing. 
In the presence of outsourcing, the optimal profit share expression is more 
complicated, but in Appendix 2 it is shown that 0??  results and thus, we yield in the 
presence of outsourcing the corner solution of a zero profit share system, too.  
We can summarize our main finding and formulate it as 
 
Proposition 3:  
If the labour union sets the effort level, the firm optimally desists from profit 
sharing.   
 
To give an explanation for this result, we have to look back on our findings. 
Concerning the effort level, we demonstrate that it is independent of profit sharing, 
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since for an exogenous profit share the labour union can negotiate the wage level to 
realize an adequate income. For a given wage level, through the unchanged decision 
about effort provision, even if the firm sets some incentives by introducing profit 
sharing, the firm only contributes a part of its profit to the workers. Thus, it is 
beneficial for the firm to avoid profit sharing. Notice that this argumentation ignores 
the wage decreasing effect obtained from profit sharing. Although the profit increases 
with  the  implementation  of  such  a  compensation  scheme,  the  firm  has  to  share  the  
whole profit with the workforce. As we show, the firm will abandon this instrument 
despite the wage reducing effect. For a profit maximizing firm, this can only be 
explained by the fact that the profit the firm owner gets without a profit sharing 
scheme  is  always  higher  than  the  share  of  profits  he  gets  in  the  presence  of  such  a  
remuneration system. Therefore, the wage decreasing effect, respectively profit 
increase  of  any  positive  profit  share  is  too  small  and  does  not  compensate  the  firm  
owner for the loss of profit by implementing a sharing system. This means that the 
loss due to sharing is for any positive profit sharing higher than the gain due to the 
wage decrease and thus the wage reduction realized by the union is lower than the 
needed wage reduction by the firm. 
We can therefore answer our main research question as follows: If the union 
sets  the  effort  level,  there  is  a  wage  moderation  effect  due  to  profit  sharing,  which  
leads to a lower outsourcing demand. Despite the existence of this effect, a profit 
maximizing firm will abstain from profit sharing, since it creates no enhancing 
productivity effect and the wage decreasing effect is too small and cannot increase the 
profit the firm gets compared to a situation without a sharing system. 
From our findings we can derive an important policy implication. If the firm 
has the power to unilaterally set the profit share, there will be no sharing system. 
Thus, if the union sets the effort level, using a profit sharing system to induce wage 
moderation and prevent outsourcing can only be realized if profit sharing is also a part 
of the wage negotiation. Alternatively the effort can also be individually determined, 
where profit sharing creates a positive effect on effort provision and thus an increase 
in productivity can be realized as shown by Koskela and Stenbacka (2006).    
Knowing the optimal effort level, relying on comparative statics, we can give a 
statement about the wage effect of outsourcing. Since in the absence and presence of 
13 
 
outsourcing the effort level is the same, we only focus on the mark-up 
1?
? ?
?A , 
with ? ? ??? ???? 11
ss  and ??? ???? 1
1
0M
. Since the mark-up is decreasing with 
higher labour demand elasticity it follows that 
0?? Mww . We can sum this up in  
 
Proposition 4:  
Outsourcing has a wage decreasing effect. 
 
This holds, since higher outsourcing demand results from lower outsourcing costs. As 
we have shown in (13) this reduces the base wage due to a more elastic labour 
demand. Thus, setting a high wage increases the loss for the union and leads to a less 
aggressive union behaviour, resulting in a lower wage, whereby the union can avoid 
outsourcing and makes integrated production more attractive. 
 
 
3.       Concluding Remarks 
 
We have focused on the question: How does profit sharing influence flexible 
outsourcing?  In  our  framework  we  show  that  the  union  fixed  effort  level  is  
independent of profit sharing. This is due to the fact that effort provision is connected 
with a disutility, which can be avoided. Also, the loss of income via this constant 
effort level can be neglected, since with its second instrument, the wage, the labour 
union can affect the income. Thus, no productivity effect, only a wage moderation 
effect may occur by implementing a profit sharing scheme. Since outsourcing and 
domestic labour are substitutes, this wage effect affects the outsourcing demand. Since 
the amount of outsourcing depends positively on the domestic wage, in general, profit 
sharing can lead to lower outsourcing due to decreasing domestic marginal costs.  
However, we demonstrate that the optimal committed profit share is zero. 
Ignoring  the  wage  effect,  this  can  be  explained  by  the  constant  effort  level.  By  
introducing profit sharing, the firm only redistributes profit from itself to the 
workforce, without any profit increasing incentives on productivity. Since despite the 
wage moderation, the firm does not implement a profit  sharing scheme, we can thus 
14 
 
conclude that the wage reduction is too small to compensate the firm’s owner for 
sharing part of the profit with the workforce. Thus, our analysis shows that there has 
to be not only a wage moderating but also an additional positive effort effect of profit 
sharing. In combination of the mentioned unclear empirical impact of profit sharing 
on effort and the problem of monitoring the effort provision of workers, we show that 
it is not profitable for the firm to implement such a compensation scheme, and thus we 
give an explanation why only few of these remuneration packages for non-managers 
will be observed.  
Moreover, we also find result that lower outsourcing costs and thus higher 
outsourcing will decrease the base wage. This follows, since we assume that 
outsourcing and domestic labour are substitutes.   
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Appendix 1: wage impact on factor demand 
Using (3a) and (3b) we can solve for the cost function by substituting the conditional 
demand system (3a) and (3b) in cMwLK ?? , where we get 
  ? ?? ? ?????? 11111/ YkYcewK ????? ???                                               (A1) 
Thus the cost share of labour and outsourcing can be expressed as 
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?
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?
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cMs .                 (A2) 
For the wage impact on labour demand, we use (3a). The derivative of concerning the 
wage can be formulated as 
? ?? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? .///
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Substituting (3a) and (A2), this expression can be simplified to 
  L
w
sL
w
Y
Y
LL ww ?????
??
?
1 .                                                            (A3) 
Rewritten the profit function to KY ???  the first order condition for a profit 
maximum is ?
?
?
?
?
1
1 Yk  can be solved to ?
?
?
?
? ???? 11 kY , which gives 
Y
w
sYw ?
?
??? 1 . Inserting this in (A3) we get 
  ? ? 01
1
??
?
??
?
? ????? s
s
w
LLw ?? .                                                        (A4) 
Analogously, we have 0?cL , 0?eL , 0?cM , 0?wM  and 0?eM . 
 
From (A4) one can determine the labour demand elasticity 
  ? ? ? ? ????? ?????????
???
1
11
1
ssss
L
wLw .                          (A5) 
 
 
Appendix 2: optimal committed profit share 
 
From  equation  (16),  we  know  that  for  10 ?? ?  the condition 1/ ** ????  has  to  be  
true. To check this condition, we use the result *??? ??? Ld
dw . Thus we have to check 
?? ddwL //* ?? . Implementing (12) and 
s
w
L ?
?? ?? 1
*
 we have to check 
  ? ? ?
?????
?
w
w
w
s
w
??
?????
??
11
1 .                                                   (A6) 
Substituting (A5) the condition can be rewritten to  
  
? ? ? ? ? ? ???
?? ??????
?
?? 111 sw
w
.                                                     (A7) 
Due to 0??
?
w
?  and 1??  the left hand side of (A7) is positive. However, we assume 
that 1??  and therefore, the right hand side can only becomes positive if at least 
0??  is true. Since implementing a negative profit share is impossible, we can 
conclude that 1/ ** ????  and thus we obtain a corner solution, where the firm desists 
from profit sharing. 
